This paper explores the idea of Howard S. Becker as organisational theorist. It examines some of the principal conceptual imagery in Becker's work, and considers the significance of this imagery for how organisations are 'seen' (conceptualised) and 'looked at' (analysed). To this end, a critical comparison of Becker's concept of world and Bourdieu's concept of field is undertaken. By his own admission, Becker recognises that some of his key studies -of art worlds, jazz musicians, educational environments, and so forth -might be recast as centrally 'about organisations'.
Introduction
The original working title for this paper was 'Howard S. Becker as Unwitting Organisational Theorist'. The impetus behind the title was the idea that Becker's work, though not often thought of as 'theoretical', nonetheless contains a series of remarkably consistent conceptual principles and analytical motifs which, arguably, have major significance for organisational theory. The aim of the paper, then, was to distil from the overall corpus of Becker's work some of its key theoretical and methodological principles and precepts, and then to go on to locate these in relation to current debates within the field. When I pitched the idea of this paper, along with its working title, to Becker himself, he immediately rejected the notion that he was an 'unwitting' organisational theorist. In his e-mailed reply, Becker wrote:
I'm not an unwitting organizational theorist, I'm an unwilling one, I think that's a distinction with a difference. Of course, I think that most of what I've done is about organizations, though I think many people would be surprised to hear that.
I mean, the books about medical students and college students are all about organizations, and the last several pages of Art Worlds offers up a generalization of the whole preceding book that is indeed really about organizations too. The book with Faulkner on jazz, likewise (Becker 2012) .
That Becker drew this pointed distinction already provides a more general insight into his sociological practice: his approach to formal theorising and his views on social theory as an enterprise in its own right; the frequent discrepancy between how others view Becker's work and how he sees it himself; and indeed, how one might recast and reconsider some of his key studies as centrally 'about organizations'. On the strength of these and further exchanges via email, I subsequently conducted a lengthy interview with Becker over Skype. The transcript of this interview, together with the personal correspondence (both of which he has permitted me to cite here) will be drawn upon throughout the following discussion so as to facilitate a dialogue with, through, and against Becker. In relation to the latter, I contrast Becker's way of 'looking' at organisations with that of Bourdieu -a figure who remains to be widely cited in contemporary organisational studies, and who in important respects presents a critical counterpoint to a Beckerian approach to imagining organisations. In particular, the contrast between Becker's concept of 'world' and Bourdieu's concept of 'field', which I 3 shall explore in some detail, serves to illustrate how Becker both 'sees' (conceptualises) and 'looks at' (analyses) organisations in ways that are in important respects distinctive, and which have significance for enduring debates in organisational studies. In this way, the paper still retains several of its core aims as it was originally conceived, however, it also goes beyond these through a central focus upon Becker's seeming ambivalence towards, and response to, some of the conceptual preoccupations -particularly those surrounding power/knowledge, structure, and agency -that in recent years have come to figure prominently in debates within organisational theory, and the social sciences more generally.
The core argument I advance in this paper is that Becker's ostensible neglect of conceptual questions, his apparent hesitance to expound formal theory, is in important respects not really a neglect or hesitance at all. Nor do such tendencies stem from theory avoidance. Rather, they form part and parcel of his more general approach to social analysis which at its core involves translating and recasting abstract conceptual dilemmas into topics to be researched. It is an approach that also involves, often quite consciously, 'looking elsewhere': of radically rejecting conventional ways of posing certain kinds of problems, and concomitantly of pursuing alternative modes of analysis and investigation. The visual metaphors I employ throughout this paper -of Becker's 'looking' and 'seeing' -are not incidental, they chime with both the formal and substantive concerns of his approach to social analysis. Becker's 'looking elsewhere' has led him towards sometimes novel empirical sites; has underpinned a series of methodological innovations; and has more generally spurred the development of a diverse portfolio of pioneering research in relation to areas that have subsequently become well-established fields within their own right. Viewed in this way, we might reimagine Becker's work as a forerunner of some of the major themes in contemporary organisational scholarship that have followed the 'cultural turn' -language, identity, representation, meaning, social and cultural production, the contingency of knowledge and knowing, visual culture, and so forth -albeit that he did not frame his analyses in relation to debates about, say, new forms of capitalism, nor has he subsequently done so. In addition, then, to an exposition of a few of the theoretical continuities to Becker's work, I shall examine his reluctance to adopt (now) standard conceptual frames from the lexicon of social theory, and will centrally consider why in certain cases he has pointedly chosen to look elsewhere and equally has encouraged others to do so 4 through promoting conceptual imagery expressly intended to escape the restrictions of certain forms of analytical convention. Ultimately, I reflect on the more general implications of Becker's approach for contemporary organisational theory and research.
'Organisation' and Organisations: Looking Elsewhere
It is first worth recounting how Becker, in our interview exchange, responded to my question of how he felt about the depiction of 'Howard S. Becker as Organisational Theorist'. He responded:
Well I am always interested in what people make of the things I have said… when I took my PhD exams we got to choose from several fields. Among them were social organisation and social psychology. Social organisation essentially meant everything that wasn't demography or social psychology. The other two possibilities were theory and methods. So in other words, the grand division was demography, social organisation, and social psychology … it had none of the connotations of being related to management or business schools or anything like that. So I am an old fashioned social organisation type.
It is in itself noteworthy that the study of organisations has become, within certain circles at least, largely synonymous with the study of management, work and industry, and more generally, the intellectual sphere pertaining to management and business schools. The longer-standing set of connotations to which Becker alludes in his response has the broader sense of referring to 'patterns' of social relationships; perhaps kinship structures, institutional arrangements, or more general social 'systems' and their 'integration'. The sense in which 'organisation' might signal a particular academic field, or perhaps better, a specific set of interests expressing various relationships between the academy, business, industry and management -and the kinds of problems with which these groups typically concern themselves -is not lost on Becker. Rather, he is here challenging the axiom that we can proceed from a common assumption concerning what 'organisational studies' entails. anthropology or sociology … done in an organization or community that engages in business as conventionally defined ' (2012: 248 Dalton (1959) explores employee theft as part of an institutionalised system of reciprocal organisational exchange. Similarly, Jackall (1988) examines how the appropriate negotiation of 'moral mazes' through the identification and application of 'rules in use' is a core part of corporate managers' occupational struggle, and a key basis for their development and promotion. Indeed, both problematize the idea of management as involving formal, planned, and rational forms of conscious control. As an extension of this point, Becker recounts the story of sitting next to a business executive on an international flight who claimed to have instituted a 'cultural change' in his organisation. Becker asked him to elaborate upon how the process was undertaken. The executive explained that he had enlisted an expert consultant who decided what the new culture should be and how this should be 'enacted' by employees. In turn, Becker explained that as a sociologist, he understood culture as 'a set of shared solutions people worked out themselves to problems they had in common', as such, instructing them by fiat to 'enact' a new culture meant he had in fact given his employees just one further problem for which they would need to devise a collective solution (Becker in Moeran 2012: 250) . At this point, the conversation came to an abrupt end. On his personal website, Becker lists as one of his treasured, self-penned quotes, 'Management is a one-word oxymoron'.
ii The other sense of 'business anthropology' that Becker identifies is 'making a business out of anthropology' -for instance, people who research shopping habits, who track patterns of consumption by demographic, and so forth. Such research, Becker suggests, typically 'takes the client's questions … there are always clients in this form of research … as givens. What the client wants to know is what the researcher wants to find out ' (2012: 248) . As such, certain questions are off limits, others are not even considered. Becker recounts an anecdote from Boys in White -the (1961) study of a Kansas medical school he undertook together with Blanche Geer, Everett Hughes, and Anselm Strauss. He recalls being pulled up by a member of the medical school's 6 faculty upon his (the faculty member's) rather angry realisation that Becker was studying him, not the students. He uses the example to illustrate a more general point:
That's almost invariably what happens when you study schools. You study the students because they are the problem. Of course, as a social scientist, you know that the problems of an organization are the problems of a whole organization, not some part of it, with other parts off limits to investigation (2012: 249).
Accordingly, when educational researchers typically research schools they might look at problems of differential attainment according to ethnicity, gender, class; student retention and truancy; pedagogy, etc. They tend not to look at why Mr Fletcher, our history teacher, is such a dick. Similarly, Becker argues, people engaged in business/management-commissioned research characteristically proceed from the starting point that their chief concerns stem from issues relating to employees or customers. As such, the possibility that those who have paid for the research might be implicated in 'the problem' is all but ruled out.
Becker's point pertains to more than simply questioning the structure of funding surrounding organisational research, or of looking at how the findings of research are contingent upon the interests of particular social groups. It relates to some of the more general characteristics of his sociological approach: of thinking through the very formulation of particular research problems; of approaching the research process itself as a collective form of common enterprise (and at that, one profoundly worthy of investigation); and of finding different 'ways in' to particular social arenas. Indeed, there is a substantial body of organisational research that takes as its point of departure the idea that the managerial prerogative should not be the defining concern for studies in the field (for a discussion of this tradition in this journal see, for example, Parker and Thomas 2011; see also Burrell and Morgan's seminal discussion of the paradigmatic underpinnings of critical management studies Burrell and Morgan [2015] ). But such critical work itself may contain seams of its own kind of orthodoxy; equally here certain kinds of question characteristically might be 'off limits' (see, for example, Kilminster 2013). Moreover, Becker's defining concern is not so much the inherent politics of research -the question of 'Whose side are we on?' (Becker 1967 ) -but of the 7 importance of 'looking elsewhere'. Thus, for instance, if we are interested in examining art as a form of collective action and social organisation it makes as much sense to start with an investigation of, say, the concerns of security guards in a public gallery as it does to commence with asking individual artists what it is that they 'do'.
People 'Doing Things Together': Power, Structure and Agency
Becker's consistent 'looking elsewhere' underpins, in part, his unwillingness to accept in any straightforward way the label of 'organisational theorist'. Yet, as he himself recognises, much of his work can be understood as being 'about organisations' to the extent that organisational research is primarily concerned with people 'doing things together' (see also Plummer's [2003] discussion and characterisation of Becker's work in this respect). This formulation -also the title of a collection of essays by Becker ) -is deceptively simple. In adopting it, Becker's stance is precisely to advocate an understanding of organisations as emergent relational and processual phenomena. In key respects, the formulation is at once anti-psychologistic and antiindividualistic. It is consonant with the broader corpus of his work in which Becker has been consistently concerned with individuals in the plural rather than 'the individual' as an isolated abstraction. In addition, the formulation 'doing things together' involves a conscious counter to the notion that 'organisations', 'structures', 'systems' and so forth can be considered as entities ontologically separate from the people who comprise them. In this vein, Becker is also anti-nominalist. In his sociological work, organisations are not considered to exist simply as categories of object -as solely discursive 'social constructions' (1986: 1-8) -they are consistently treated as real, emergent phenomena. One of Becker's favourite illustrations (see also Plummer 2003: 26; Becker 2008: 379-80) in this respect involves paraphrasing the words of the playwright David Mamet. As Becker recounted it to me during our interview:
In every scene in a play, everybody who is on stage, everybody who is in that scene is there for a reason, if they didn't have a reason to be in that situation, they wouldn't be there… but the thing is so are all those other people who are there -trying to achieve what they are trying to do. And what eventually comes out of it is what they are all willing to agree to... It is never anything that any one of them wanted. You know, it is never what they thought they were going to get when they got in, but it is like the best they could do with the moment. Alright 8 that is a metaphor … but it is a theory, it is a theory of how things work. It is very close … to Bruno Latour's way of thinking about science.
Elsewhere, Becker has also described this 'emergent social order' metaphor as akin to Herbert Blumer's notion of 'collective action' (Becker in Plummer 2003: 26) . Becker more generally rejects the classification of his own work as symbolic interactionist, but notes that this core insight, which forms a cornerstone of the symbolic interactionist approach as it was originally developed by the likes of Mead and Blumer, is probably 'the only part worth having' -the only part that he considers to be worth retaining (Becker in Plummer 2003: 26) . In advocating a key facet of what, ostensibly, appears to be a classic symbolic interactionist stance, then, Becker looks to be adopting a position that has by now long been critiqued for its neglect of power, structure, and its over-stress on agency. However, Becker's position is rather more complex in this respect that it might initially appear.
To this end, a brief comparison with Norbert Elias's concept of 'figuration' may be instructive. In What is Sociology? (Elias 2012 (Elias [1970 ) Elias commences his exposition of the concept of figuration by introducing a series of game models. The first of the models he presents involves an analogy that shares certain key characteristics with the Mamet/play example provided by Becker. It involves two relatively equally matched players engaged in a game of chess, each taking account of the other's move, such that the game begins to follow a course that neither had intended, and which becomes difficult to predict even several moves in advance. The game's changing course, its 'figuration', to use Elias's concept, in turn becomes something that both players become effectively 'subject to'. Elias develops a series of progressively more complex models to advance a cognate 'emergent order' principle, eventually modelling multi-tier contests which are analogous to large social organisations and nation states. In each case, Elias observes the complex ways in which human plans, intentions, decisions, actions combine and interlace to form a basic 'tissue' -an order that is greater and more compelling than any of the individuals who are the elementary units of its constitution. Like Elias, then, Becker here and elsewhere uses social (rather than, say, organic or mechanistic) metaphors to explain complex social phenomena. Contained in both the metaphors of a game and of a play, we might, for example, identify 'structure' modelled in Elias's case as a game's changing course, or in Becker's case as a kind of 9 compromise or 'inertia' reached by people on stage through their collective action.
Similarly, we might identify 'agency' here, variously, in people pursuing their own interests; seeking, with varying degrees of success, their own ends; engaged together in common practices and activities; and more generally trying to gain advantage or to 'win'. However, in both cases structure and agency are understood as effectively different facets of the same whole.
iii For Becker, different kinds of social formation are not 'supra-individual' in an ontological sense, but neither are they simply reducible to 'individuals' per se: they can come to have a degree of independence from any particular individual, but not from individuals as such. Moreover, in various parts of his sociological work, Becker has centrally explored social processes which encompass both social production and reproduction simultaneously. For example, as Robert Clulely (2012) has suggested, Becker's (2008 Becker's ( [1982 ) work on Art Worlds might be said to depict, in the Giddensian sense, a form of 'structuration' (Giddens 1984; Cluley 2012) . This is apparent in Becker's suggestion in the earlier-cited extract that the play/Mamet example invokes a principle that is consistent with the theoretical work of Bruno Latour is also noteworthy.
In an interview with Harvey Molotch (2012), Becker notes that Latour's arguments in
The Pasteurisation of France and Science in Action -in particular the notion that the fate of any particular scientific finding is, effectively, 'in the hands of the people who take it up' -were very similar to his (Becker's) own, only extended to a different substantive arena (Molotch 2012: 441) . Indeed, the emergent order Becker illustrates through his paraphrasing of Mamet is in certain ways similar to Latourian concepts of 'machine' and 'assemblage' -in which independent parts combine in such a way that they come to comprise a level of integration at which each individual component is both controlled and controlling. As Becker expresses it elsewhere in exposition of Latour's principles: '"people are tied into the machine and the machine is tied into what they're doing, and you can think of that as a bigger machine". It's another way of talking about the same thing' (Becker in Plummer 2003: 26) . Latour, conversely, has observed how Becker's work parallels his own in important respects (see Latour 2003: 144) . I asked Becker if he 'went along with the idea of assemblages, actor networks, and so forth'. Becker responded:
You know, Bruno likes to say that he takes science just as seriously as the people who do it take it, no more. That is to say, he doesn't fetishize it the way a lot of social scientists do with physical science… so I feel the same way about Bruno, I believe that theory just as much as he does. And no more. I think it is very obvious that Latour thinks of all that as something that he uses to understand the next thing he looks at.
Becker's observations concerning Latour's theoretical approach relate to his more general stance on theory, to which I will return later in this paper. However, for the moment, it is noteworthy that, at least on the face of it, Becker's approach to organisations as people 'doing things together' shares key commonalities with actor network theory, aspects of figurational sociology, and looks to be consistent with a broader 'relational/processual turn' within organisational scholarship (see, for example, Bakken and Hernes 2006; Chia 1996 Chia , 1999 Tsoukas 2001; Tsoukas and Chia 2002; Weik 2011) Worlds (2008 [1982] ), Becker effectively challenges the myth of art as simply 'the work of great, highly talented individuals'. He shows how 'All artistic work, like all human activity, involves the joint activity of a number, often a large number, of people'. Indeed, it is only 'Through their cooperation, the art work we eventually see or hear comes to be and continues to be' (Becker 2008: 1) . As Bourdieu (1983) has recognised, Becker's focus on art as structured collective action facilitates an analytical shift away from 'the individual artist' and towards always a plurality of individuals -a shifting network of people who provide material resources, capital of various forms, channels of distribution, and who ultimately comprise the market for consuming the works thus created.
Fields and Worlds: Becker and Bourdieu
There are, nonetheless, some key differences in the work of Becker and Bourdieu. It is worth considering these differences both to facilitate a discussion in greater depth of the status of 'structure' in the work of Becker, and more generally to explore Becker's concept of 'world' as an organisational metaphor. Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) have argued that a key distinction to be drawn between Becker and Bourdieu pertains to what they call the 'interactionist fallacy', which involves, they propose, the analytical conflation of the structure of a field with the networks of interaction through which a field becomes visible (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 113-14; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008: 8-9) . In other words, the emergent order of an interactional network should not, they argue, be taken for all intents and purposes as one and the same thing as the 'struggle for the imposition of an organizing principle', itself based around the contestation over unevenly distributed economic, political, and positional resources (2008: 8) . A similar distinction adopted by Giddens also means there are clear limits to the extent to which we might label Becker's work 'structurationist'. As we have seen, Giddens shares with Becker the idea that 'agents' and 'structures' are more a 'duality' than a 'dualism'. However, Giddens draws a clear distinction between 'structures' and 'systems'. The former he understands to be rules and resources that, as Giddens expresses it, both enable and constrain the relations between people, and which are 'instantiated' in 'recursive' patterns of social practice or 'systems' (Giddens 1984) . To this end, Giddens considers 'structuration' to involve considerably more than the formation of emergent social systems. (Bachelard 1929) ; 'generative mechanisms' (Harré and Madden 1975) ; and 'tendencies and causal powers' which can only be analysed in and through the ways of acting of things (Bhaskar 1978 (Bhaskar [1975 [1979 ).
However, such a critique of Becker's work holds only to the extent that one accepts the classic Kantian noumenal/phenomenal divide whereby 'deep structural mechanisms' supposedly beyond the ken of observation are understood to 'give rise to' visible patterns of relationship -imagery which, not by coincidence, is redolent of the classical structuralist surface/deep structure dichotomy. For Becker, such notions, such ways of visualising the social world, are unhelpful and misleading. Becker's arguments concerning cognate issues would suggest that, from his standpoint, the capacity to apprehend particular kinds of social relationship, particular 'social phenomena' is as much a question of analytical visibility as it is of the intrinsic 'ontological properties' of 13 the social world. In this sense, 'structure' might be considered 'invisible' only to the extent that it is not (yet) properly understood, and 'deep' only in the sense of it entailing considerably greater complexity than face-to-face 'interactions'. Becker thus recognises the social contingency of knowledge -of how, in particular, certain 'institutional arrangements' can (sometimes through intent) serve as a constraint over the apprehension of certain aspects and facets of the social world.
However, for Becker, the idea that observable social relationships constitute a kind of 'froth', that needs, analytically speaking, to be 'wiped away' so as to probe into 'deeper'
'generative' structures in a quest to discover 'the truth' involves conceptual imagery which is profoundly at odds with his own. Such notions, he suggests, appear to be based upon a kind of mythological conception of the 'heroic social analyst' who seemingly assumes a special kind of epistemic privilege in apprehending the world.
The 'visibility' of social phenomena is for Becker fundamentally related to both the complexity of social relationships and to levels of knowledge about the world. Indeed, much depends on the very metaphors we use to understand and approach particular kinds of social practice. In this respect, he advances a kind of pragmatist epistemological principle as the crucial test of any particular theoretical lens or metaphor. In using any particular concept or metaphor, Becker proposes, we might ask what can now be seen that was previously invisible? What questions can now be answered that had previously have been ignored? What operations can now be undertaken with a firmer and clearer evidential basis? (Becker 1986: 2) . In considering Bourdieu's concept of field, Becker finds a number of key restrictions in these respects.
Becker's core critique of Bourdieu's concept of field is that the metaphor is, in many ways, a highly restrictive one. It is a metaphor that, in a lineage that runs from Ernst Cassirer's (1953 Cassirer's ( [1923 ) neo-Kantian philosophical work on mathematics and concept formation through to Kurt Lewin's (1936) vector psychology, v involves imagery imported from physics to invoke, for example, 'fields of forces' akin to, say, magnetic fields (see for a fuller discussion of the development of field theory, including
Bourdieu's position within it, Martin 2003) . It is also a spatial metaphor, and at that, Becker observes, a somewhat claustrophobic one. The space within a field, so it is understood, is always finite, and as such, people are typically seen to be struggling over limited 'space' -be that analogous of power under diverse guises, constrained resources, or positional access of various kinds (Becker 2008: 373) . This finitude also means that not all moves are possible -that human exchanges are always zero sum: Accordingly, what might appear to be 'scientific discovery' may in fact be more the product of the metaphorical style of a particular mode of analysis. To put it provocatively, 'hidden truths' may be more superimposed than 'uncovered' through the application of field.
For Becker, the question of what is made analytically invisible when one employs the concept of field also remains to be a pertinent one. The dangers of the concept of field are realised, for example, in assuming that particular arenas of social life are 'closed', in the sense that a particular group has monopolised access to participation within a specific sphere of activity (Becker 2008: 375-6 Becker's concept of world, then, has certain key differences from that of 'field'. Like all concepts, Becker suggests, it is still a metaphor of sorts. However, it is not a metaphor that conjures images of a playing field, or a force field, or a kind of box with photons shooting in different directions (Becker 2008: 374) . But even if we were to still think of 'world' in spatial terms -and Becker insists it should not be approached as a spatial metaphor -it is far more expansive a metaphor than that of field. It is a metaphor oriented empirically towards people 'trying to get things done ' (2008: 379 Considering organisations as 'worlds', then, demands a cognitive shift away from imagining discrete social worlds that begin and end with the physical boundaries of particular premises, or that are delimited by recognised ties of affiliation and membership. Such physical and discursive demarcations are not without their significance. However, for the purposes of social analysis, they should not be taken to 17 define in any simple or straightforward sense the empirical objects of investigation (Becker 2008: 376) . Indeed, assuming that one is about to encounter a 'bounded' or 'contained' 'field' might predispose a social analyst towards ignoring emergent forms of involvement, association and influence within a social world. Yes, yes … and Latour is the obvious proponent of that way of thinking too because you know, the difference between network and world is not so enormous, I mean they are both metaphorical but they are kind of open metaphors that let you add things. They don't commit you to so much. And the field metaphor -the way that Bourdieu used it -really is very constraining. It limits you to the topic of zero sum gain… well look at the book that Rob and I did [Faulkner and Becker 2009] . That is not a zero sum game. When we get on the stand, the object is to find something that we will all be happy enough with, that we can get through the night with. And doing that successfully is a positive sum gain, everybody gets something. 
Language and Conceptual Totems
The 'openness' of the concept of world, and in particular, the formulation of organisations as 'people doing things together' might wrongly convey the impression that Becker considers social life to be more amenable to adaptation, change, and voluntaristic impulse than it actually is (Becker 2008: 380) . Such connotations, Becker suggests, would be somewhat unwelcome since social life evidently does have regularities, people generally do not act in entirely spontaneous ways, and there are indeed notable enduring characteristics to many aspects of everyday life. However,
Becker pointedly stops short of referring to 'structure' and 'power' to explain such enduring regularities. In my interview with him, I asked him if in not using the terms he had neglected these concerns. He suggested that, conversely, in not using the terms, some people talk about that way very often as 'inertia'. In other words, you know, nobody is exerting power to make me play a piano that has 88 keys on it, and that the notes of which can be notated on a staff of five lines, etc. That is there and it stays there because most of the people who are involved with such things recognise it, and it is useful to them in getting on with what they do to recognise that. So when I arrive, you know, I don't have a whole lot of choice. I can start all over again, and people have done that, or I can say well that is the way it is, that is the 'power' of 'social structure'. Well that is not the power of social structure, that is the 'power' of people doing things in the way that is most convenient for them because it has been set up in years past.
Becker's insistence on using terms like 'inertia' or, elsewhere, 'convention' and 'repertoire' (Becker and Faulkner 2008 ) is thus expressly intended to avoid a reification of 'power' and 'structure' as entities beyond the level of human relationships that, in turn, exert influence over those relations, and which somehow undergird all forms of 'collective action'. vi Also of significance is Becker's comment that the use of such terms is 'a kind of religious thing'. This point relates to more than mere linguistic preferences:
it is arguably indicative of Becker's more general stance concerning the tendency in the social sciences towards a treatment of concepts and particular linguistic signifiers as conceptual amulets, together with a more general fetishisation of 'social theory'. Chris 20 Rojek and Bryan Turner (Rojek and Turner 2000) have described this prevailing tendency as comprising a 'decorative turn' in the social sciences. To simplify somewhat, the decorative turn involves the dominant tendency to employ theory, particularly that which is in vogue, in a manner which serves principally to adorn or otherwise 'decorate' empirical analyses. Theory employed in a 'decorative' manner is characteristically projected on to research, rather than developed in tandem with it. It is used to lend ostensible veracity and rigour to otherwise relatively pedestrian empirical observations.
Such tendencies, in turn, can be understood as in part responses to a publication/promotion environment in which lexical sophistication is actively encouraged and is often treated as a proxy for academic value. Becker has discussed this tendency at length in his somewhat iconoclastic Writing for Social Scientists (1986).
These arguments have also been taken up more recently by Michael Billig in Learning to Write Badly: How to Succeed in the Social Sciences (Billig 2013) . In personal e-mail correspondence, Becker nicely summarises his position on theory in this respect:
The establishing of a dominant paradigm in our racket has to be a sociological phenomenon, not something that will ever be settled by epistemological (or any other kind of philosophical or 'theoretical') arguments. It has always been settled by people getting small semi-monopolies here and there over the training of graduate students and disciples, the control of journals thought to be influential, and of other publishing outlets (this is one of the ways Bourdieu got to be so dominant for a while in France). And the ability to do that depends on the ground the fighting takes place on. Becker's comments above help explain why it is that he has pointedly 'looked elsewhere' in the sense of his tendency not to have adopted more general concepts from the social sciences. Again, this can be understood to be related to his sociological practice in which theory is never treated as an end in itself. Somewhat paradoxically, in this respect he shares considerable common ground with Bourdieu who has similarly written in critique of what he calls 'theoretical theory' or theory without object. In theoretical theory, Bourdieu proposes, theory is effectively treated as a substitute for research. What comes to count as 'theory' invariably takes the form of sterile, abstract self-perpetuating polemics which involve 'vacuous meta-discourse around concepts treated as intellectual totems' (Bourdieu in Wacquant 1989: 50) . In turn, the enterprise of theoretical theory leads to a proliferation of '…endless and unassailable "conceptual melting pots" of neologisms, refurbished categories, and pseudo-theorems, generally closed by a call for further research or empirical application, preferably by others' (Bourdieu in Wacquant 1989: 50 Overall, I have argued that a key facet of Becker's work resides in his capacity to translate, to the extent that we can draw a neat line of delineation, abstract philosophical questions into concrete, researchable ones. Becker does not play the 'social theory' game, or at least, he does not do so in any kind of conventional way. But that depiction of social theory -as but one game, one way to go, among many others, nothing to get particularly het up about -is very much a motif of his sociological practice. As Harvey Molotch (2012: 423) has suggested, Becker's empirical embrace of the informal and the mundane, his rejection of all forms of intellectual pretentiousness, marks out many of the distinctive characteristics of his more general approach to sociology. Becker's radicalism finds expression, for example, not so much in abstract polemics about structural antagonisms, but in, say, his critique of the inherent elitism involved in the politics of academic writing and research; and in other ways paying attention to topics, concerns, issues which run counter to the more general direction of travel within the social scientific establishment. It is also perhaps noteworthy that, while
Becker's work on deviance and education, to take just two examples, was not centrally concerned with problems of social class it, perhaps more than any other scholar of his era, has been readily extended to analyses of class, social control, and more general relationships of dominance and subjugation, by a multitude of subsequent researchers.
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For the study of organisations, then, Becker's work might be boiled down to a few core elements -a kind of manifesto for looking elsewhere:
1. Looking elsewhere typically means proceeding from the understanding that official or received accounts of how organisations function and operate are likely to be significantly at odds with how they actually function and operate. In much of his ethnographic work, Becker is interested in why and how rules are circumvented and broken, and in how seemingly irrational behaviours and attitudes are often quite rational and understandable when understood from the perspective of those who engage in them. In this way, we might understand
Becker's work -particularly its concern with deviant and abnormal behavioursas a fore-runner of more recent organisational scholarship primarily concerned with the 'grey zones' and 'dark sides' of organisations (see, for example, Linstead, Maréchel and Griffin 2014).
2. In relation to the latter, Becker is consistently sensitive to the problems with which different groups concern themselves. This informs both his way of 'seeing'
and his way of 'looking at' organisations. For example, his view of organisational culture as shared solutions to a common set of problems is grounded in the idea that shared values emerge from people 'doing things together', not simply by decree from the 'standard practices division', or from a consultancy-penned mission statement. Similarly, Becker might ask organisational researchers to ask themselves 'whose question are you asking'?
Are researchers asking questions which follow the interests of those in the power apex of the organisations considered -questions, say, about how best to enhance the productivity of employees, reduce absenteeism, monitor workflows, and so forth? Or do their questions stem more from the concerns of a particular intellectual community -perhaps an engagement with issues of, say, power, subjugation and the labour process that might follow from being a critically minded organisational scholar? Becker's characteristic approach is not altogether to dismiss either set of concerns, but rather to consider what kinds of questions might be 'off limits' when we concern ourselves solely, perhaps exclusively, with the problems with which a particular group (including our own professional and intellectual group) are preoccupied. Accordingly, he alerts us 24 to consider the problems with which those we study are concerned since these might allow us to reframe our own questions and lines of investigation.
3. Becker's work typically sensitises researchers to the marginal and exceptional.
It follows in a tradition of Chicago School research on offbeat, dirty and minority occupations -the so called 'nuts and sluts' tradition (Watson 1997; Badham et al. 2003: 5) . In this sense 'looking elsewhere' involves a kind of ethnographic version of the 'null hypothesis trick' (see Becker 1998) . If a researcher is interested, for example, in how rules concerning dress codes within an office are established and maintained, following Becker, we might look where we expect to find no rules -perhaps a dress-down Friday. Here, to continue with the same example, we might find an unspoken dress code at play, albeit that it is not formally articulated in the manner of a uniform, nor 'policed' in any conspicuous manner. Becker's work thus encourages researchers to find 'ways in' to particular problems and the empirical sites to which they pertain that are counter-intuitive and 'unconventional'.
4. Again, following on from the point above, Becker throughout his work has consistently maintained a fundamental engagement with 'convention'. This engagement sometimes surfaces as a scepticism concerning dominant analytical convention. His hesitance concerning the use of terms such as 'power', 'structure' and 'agency' is a case in point. Becker's approach is not so much to avoid or altogether shun the use of conceptual terminology, but rather, to encourage a reflexive engagement with concepts; to avoid unnecessary lexical complexity; and to ensure that concepts and terminology are germane to the problems with which we concern ourselves. Becker's work is thus not so much anti-theory, but rather, is anti-theory-without-object. His sociological practice -and explicit advice -steers a researcher away from a concern with 'social' or 'organisational theory' in a general and abstracted sense, and towards a consideration of theoretical questions only as part-and-parcel of discrete investigations of concrete empirical phenomena. Becker would thus likely find little analytical value in the complex and sophisticated polemics concerning 'high' theory which sometimes grace the pages of this journal and others similar. Indeed, he would see intellectual time and effort as better spent pursuing concrete research problems than dwelling on the nuances of conceptual architecture (present discussion included).
25 5. That said, I have argued throughout this paper that irrespective of whether or not Becker can be said to be a organisational theorist in a formal sense, his work nonetheless has major theoretical significance. Of particular significance are the idea of organisations as 'people doing things together', and the imagery of 'world' as ways of 'seeing' and 'looking at' organisations. Here 'looking elsewhere' involves an epistemic 'openness' to avoid, say, assuming either inevitable conflict or consensus in the relationships we study. It also involves an engagement with concrete social relationships and processes. In this sense, I
have suggested, Becker's 'looking' elsewhere to a degree accords with a more general 'turn' to relational and processual anti-substantialist thinking in the social sciences.
In these ways and others, Becker's work anticipates some of the key developments in the field of organisational studies over the last several decades. There are important parallels with other approaches, notably those that centrally employ the metaphor of networks as the cornerstone of their analyses, and which more generally form part of a shift away from an engagement with 'essences' and towards an engagement with 'flows'. However, arguably the most significant aspect of Becker's sociological practice resides not so much in how it might be characterised, how it might address, or not, some of the debates that have come to dominate the field or organisational research in recent years, but in terms of the tremendous range of insight it has demonstrably been able to realise. The 'model' contained within Becker's sociology in this respect is not a model comprised of conceptual formalism, but a model of intellectual practice and at that, one that offers considerable potential for organisational scholars who are willing to 'look elsewhere'.
Notes i
The historical relationship between the emergence of 'management and organisational studies'
and the 'transformation of disciplines' has been discussed in detail elsewhere. See, in particular, Zald (2002) .
ii Badham et al. (2003) have drawn extensively on Becker's work to explore in depth some of the issues Becker alludes to concerning culture change. Drawing upon Becker, we can observe how 'culture change' initiatives typically bear all the hallmarks of 'moral crusades', proceeding in part by stigmatising behaviours that deviate from corporate norms. The problem that employees typically then have to solve is how to avoid such stigmatization whilst meeting the expectation of having wholeheartedly 'bought in' to a kind of enforced corporate gemeinschaft. However, for Badham et al. deviance does not simply exist as counter-culture. In their analysis of a culture change programme at 'Sprogworks', a large Australian corporation, Badham et al. found deviance effectively mobilized in the service of a culture change initiative, whereby a 'deviant radicalism' came to be championed in favour of 'deviant conservatism'. They show how the dynamics of deviance and culture change are multifaceted and complex: under some conditions deviance can become subsumed within the very normative systems to which such behaviours originally ran counter.
iii It is beyond the scope of this paper to undertake a systematic comparison between the work of Becker and Elias. Elias is arguably more concerned with the longue durée than Becker, and there are important differences between Becker and Elias in relation to the latter's focus on interdependence. Nonetheless, as has been highlighted elsewhere (Dunning and Hughes 2013: 149-50) , there are clear lines of compatibility, particularly in respect of Becker's orientation towards 'process'. iv Once again, Elias's concept of 'chains of interdependence' (Elias 2012) -increasingly complex, often asymmetrical, multi-directional power relations which extend considerably beyond face-to-face encounters -is here a useful counterpoint to the concept of 'interaction'. Consider, for example, how a typical European breakfast involves enduring ties between people who typically never meet, are often separated by continents, and yet are still profoundly bound together in chains of interdependence -themselves expressive or enormous social/structural complexity. Chains of interdependence are 'deep' in as much as they span enormous complexity and constitute long-term social processes. Indeed the spatial metaphors of 'depth' and 'visibility' are at odds, in important ways, with the relational/processual thinking of Elias. Equally dangerous, for Elias, are others such as the common tendency towards an overextension of linguistic analogies, such as the distinction between langue and parole. To put it crudely, thinking of 'structure' as akin to 'grammar' and 'agency' as akin to 'speech' involves precisely the kinds of ontologically specious separation and dualistic thinking that grand scale synthesizing ontologies, such as that of Giddens, sought to transcend. v The influence of the work of both figures is apparent in relation to several aspects of Bourdieu's conceptual architecture, the concept of field is principal among these (see, for example, DiMaggio 1979; Emirbayer 1997; Martin 2003) . vi Becker discusses his alternatives to 'power' and 'structure' in numerous places, see in particular Becker (1995) .
